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Abstract—This paper focuses on the security of the remote 
laboratories formed by remote experiments against malign 
attacks. Surprisingly, in spite of the fact the remote 
laboratories have been existing for at least three decades but 
virtually no attention has been devoted to this vital subject. 
Various malign attacks are analyzed in detail related to the 
Measureserver® module, which is the basic unit of the ISES 
(Internet School Experimental System) remote experiments 
accessed by clients via web pages. Such the laboratories are 
sometimes called e-laboratories. In the introduction a state 
of the art, basic features and principles are described. The 
following chapter analyses general security risks of remote 
laboratories for their software, hardware and specific risks. 
Next, possible malicious attacks are determined which could 
affect the Measureserver module. Finally, the suggestions 
for adequate security software and hardware solutions are 
outlined to prevent such attacks. 
Index Terms—ISES, Measureserver, remote laboratory, 
remote experiment, malign attack, security. 
I. STATE OF THE ART OF REMOTE LABORATORIES 
 The traditional approach of teaching and dissemination 
of scientific educational subjects, oriented on both 
students at secondary schools and universities, are quite 
outmoded and not so popular. The contemporary students 
demand a higher level of the learning methods, which 
help more efficiently to perceive phenomena of the real 
world. An accessibility of experimental tools is also a 
factor that is important for students who often prefer 
studying scientific subjects via the Internet. This 
development reveals several new important ICT 
(Information and Communication Technologies) tools. 
One of them is a remote laboratory (RL) with remote 
experiments (RE) so called the e-laboratories accessible 
globally in the time regime 24/7, accessible in majority 
cases free of cost (the present state of remote laboratories 
may be found in recent monographs [1][2]). Their 
physical SW&HW, as well as the informatics SW&HW 
differ widely [3]. 
 RLs are built on the ISES that has been entirely 
developed for educational purposes. The ISES is a 
complex tool for the real time acquisition and remote data 
acquisition, data processing, experiments control and 
other processes. It is an open system consisting of a basic 
ISES hardware with the ISES WIN software intended for 
local computer oriented laboratory and ISES WEB 
Control Kit for its remote counterpart [4]. Recently, the 
friendly environment for an intuitive compiling of the 
control programs of REs was written called EASY 
REMOTE - ISES (ER - ISES) as the superstructure based 
on the ISES equipment. The ER - ISES has been invented 
and developed in cooperation with TBU in Zlín and 
Charles University in Prague [5][8]. Let us briefly 
describe the functioning principle of ISES RL. 
 The control system of ISES RE is depicted in Figure 1 
and its functioning is described in the client-server 
communication scheme in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The first component of ISES REs is the apparatus 
(physical HW), which is the most important hardware 
component including all the equipment in order to 
examine and measure the phenomenon. The apparatus 
consists of ISES probes, sensors, meters, (volt-meter, 
ampere-meter, ohm-meter, flow-meter), thermocouple, 
etc. It is wired to the ISES panel transferring electrical 
signals incoming from those measurement accessories to 
the PCI AD-DA (Analog-to-Digital - Digital-to-Analog) 
converter installed on a control computer to gather and 
process all the data from the apparatus. 
 The second component is the Measureserver module, 
the most important software component of ISES REs 
functioning as the finite state machine (FSM) [12]. It 
directly communicates with the apparatus, processes the 
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Figure 1. The HW&SW components of ISES remote experiment [9] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The arrangement of ISES remote experiment [11] 
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measured data and control commands. The main feature 
of Measureserver is setting the ISES panel, sensors with 
meters for a data collection and processing control 
commands. The Measureserver dynamically responds to 
signals incoming from the apparatus, as well as all the 
commands transmitted from the client's web page. 
Measureserver has the following three components: 
- Measureserver’s core, 
- Hardware plug-in, 
- PSC script file. 
The Measureserver core is responsible for the data and 
commands transfer, clients serving and for the execution 
of control commands, which is controlled by the PSC 
script file imported to Measureserver. The PSC script is a 
unique programming language specially designed for 
ISES REs. This language is a non-compliable that defines 
a behavior of the Measureserver’s core. The hardware 
plug-in provides needed functionality to control the ISES 
panel transferring signals from/to the apparatus [6]. 
 The third component is called HttpRelayServer. This 
component cooperates with the Nginx web server and 
takes care about available ports needed for the LAN 
(Local Area Network) communication. It is a common 
habit by system administrators to block all ports for 
security reasons except ports defined as 80 and 443. 
HttpRelayServer dynamically monitors and changes the 
communication to the available port. 
 The fourth component is ImageServer in order to serve 
for life view of ISES REs. The module periodically saves 
an actual view of the realized RE from the USB web 
camera to store the image data file [7]. 
 The fifth component is the web server intended for the 
communication between RE and the client's side. At 
present, Nginx is used due to its sufficient stability to 
transfer the RE web page to the client’s computer. 
 The sixth and the last component is the RE web page 
providing clients all the available features of running 
ISES RE via standard web browsers. 
 Clients have a non-stop accessibility to enter ISES RE 
via their web browsers connected to the Internet from 
anywhere. The most significant advantage is real-time 
experimenting with the apparatus installed in a remote 
laboratory. The apparatus sends measured data through 
particular subsystems to all entered clients. After the 
accomplishment, the active client is allowed to sort, filter 
and visualize all the received data in graphical charts and 
well-arranged tables to find corresponding answers 
regarding the observed phenomena. 
 Surprisingly, in spite of the fact the RLs have been 
existing for at least three decades [10], virtually no 
attention has been devoted to the vital subject of their 
security that is the topic of the paper. The paper analyses 
the security of RLs, especially the Measureserver module. 
The following chapter describes general security risks of 
RLs due to their software, hardware and specific risks. 
Next, the potential and existing attacks are analyzed that 
threaten Measureserver and the most vulnerable ISES RE 
components. It concerns the unauthorized access into the 
Measureserver module, faking queries performed via 
communication protocols and failure of hardware 
components in the apparatus. Finally, the suggestions are 
outlined for adequate security software and hardware 
solutions related to the Measureserver module. 
II. GENERAL SECURITY RISKS OF REMOTE EXPERIMENTS 
 Let us enumerate already occurring general security 
risks of RLs. The security aspect is very important for 
real-time experimenting, especially when newcomers 
enter the system to try RE in order to test its capabilities. 
Unreliable and malfunctioning REs may cause a bad 
reputation that is perceived negatively by some potential 
clients. Such affection can also seriously degrade 
usefulness of this new educational tool. 
 All REs share some common security risks. The RE 
consists of the physical & informatics HW and 
informatics SW. Let us now describe the common 
security risks for individual components of the RE as 
presented in Figure 1. 
 Physical and Informatics HW security aspect: As the 
name suggests, this category includes deliberate damage 
of physical HW. This aspect is given in the most of cases 
by situating the Res in a building and locked room. 
Adequate and regular inspection including maintenance 
of the REs equipment is a stringent and often 
underestimated condition for running of the e-laboratory. 
The hardware of REs can be damaged as well through the 
fault or mishandling by connected clients. All these 
circumstances should have been attended to the 
controlling program of REs [10]. 
 Informatics SW security aspect: This kind of attacks 
comes from the Internet in the most cases. Since the 
apparatus is completely controlled and monitored by a 
computer (server) connected to LAN, across which the 
access to the Internet is realized, all the applications 
residing on that computer are vulnerable to unauthorized 
people or hackers. These attacks lead to the harming or 
overloading of involved computer or damage front end 
applications like is Measureserver and HttpRelayServer. 
Intentional unauthorized intrusions to Measureserver and 
its possible damage are analyzed later in the paper. This 
sort of attacks also relates to the web applications at the 
client's side. All the potential security risks of web 
application are discussed later due to their importance. 
 Security aspect due to the environment: This security 
aspect deals with all the failures of the power supply like 
power outage or voltage spikes. Usually, the surge 
protection and circuit breakers are adequate security for 
elementary experiments. However, the experiments using 
expensive measuring and controlling devices require 
comprehensive security measures. 
A. Security risks due to web applications 
 If unknown users can access the web application, they 
are potentially malicious users who can try to gain 
unauthorized access. Servers connected to the public on 
the Internet are constantly probed for vulnerabilities. 
Therefore, it is recommended to take precautions and 
build security into all involved web applications. 
 Implementing adequate security mechanism is only 
part of the solution. Another important part of the 
efficient measures is vigilance. Even if the system has 
many security safeguards, it is needed to watch it closely 
in following precautionary ways: 
 - Monitor the operating system's event logs. Watch for 
repeated attempts to log into the system or for excessive 
requests being made against the web server. 
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 - Continually keep the application server up to date 
with the latest security updates, as well as any updates for 
other data sources that the application might use. 
 The important part of developing more secure web 
application is to understand well the threats to it. For 
example, Microsoft has developed a way to categorize 
threats. The subchapter below describes these threats and 
how they apply to the web applications [13]. 
 Spoofing - to spoof is to impersonate a user or process 
in an unauthorized way. At its simplest, spoofing can 
mean typing in a different user's credentials. Malicious 
users might also change the contents of a cookie to 
pretend that he/she is a different user or that the cookie 
comes from a different server. In general, user can help 
prevent spoofing by using stringent authentication. Any 
time someone requests access to non-public information, 
be sure they are who they say they are. User can help 
defend as well against spoofing by keeping credential 
information safe. Such as, not to keep a password or other 
sensitive information in a cookie, where a malicious user 
can find or modify it. 
 Tampering - means changing or deleting a resource 
without authorization. One example is defacing a web 
page, where the malicious user gets into your site and 
changes files. An indirect way to tamper is by using a 
script exploit. A malicious user manages to get script to 
execute by masking it as user input from a page or as a 
link. A primary defense against tampering is to actively 
use e.g. Windows security to lock down files, directories 
and other resources. The application should also run with 
minimum privileges. User helps guard against script 
exploits by not trusting any information that comes from 
a different user or even from a database. Whenever user 
gets information from an untrusted source, he takes steps 
to be sure it does not contain any executable code. 
 Repudiation - this kind of threat involves carrying out a 
transaction in such a way that there is no proof after the 
fact of the principals involved in the transaction. In a web 
application, this can mean impersonating an innocent 
user's credentials. User can help guard against repudiation 
by using stringent authentication. In addition, use e.g. the 
logging features of Windows to keep an audit trail of any 
activity on the server. 
 Information Disclosure - simply means stealing or 
revealing information that is supposed to be private. A 
typical example is the stealing passwords but information 
disclosure can involve access to any file or resource on 
the server. The best defense against information 
disclosure is to have no information to disclose. For 
example, if user avoids storing passwords, malicious 
users cannot steal them. An alternative is to store only a 
hash of password. When different user presents 
credentials, user can hash the user's password and 
compare only the hashes of the two. If user does store 
sensitive information, he can use e.g. Microsoft Windows 
security to help secure it. As always, user should simply 
use up authentication to help ensure that only authorized 
users can access restricted information. If user has to 
expose sensitive information, it is recommended that a 
user encrypts the information when stored and use SSL 
(Layer Secure Sockets) to encrypt the information when 
sent to and from the browser. 
 Denial of Service - this attack deliberately causes an 
application to be less available than it should be. A 
typical example is to overload a web application so that it 
cannot serve ordinary users. Alternatively, malicious 
users might try to simply crash your server. Internet 
Information Services (IIS) enables user to throttle 
applications, which means that it limits the number of 
requests it will serve. User might be able to deny access 
to other users or IP addresses known to be malicious. 
Keeping the applications online is a matter of running 
robust code. User should test the application thoroughly 
and respond to error conditions wherever possible. 
 Elevation of Privilege - this attack uses up malicious 
means to get more permissions than normally assigned. 
For example, in a successful elevation-of-privilege attack, 
a malicious user manages to get administrative privileges 
to the web server, giving himself or herself access to any 
data on the server as well as control over server 
capabilities. To help protect against the elevation of 
privilege, authorized user should run the application in a 
least-privilege context if practical. It is recommended for 
a certainty that such user does not run applications based 
on ASP.NET (Active Server Pages developed by .NET 
language) as the system (administrative) user [13]. 
 Clients should also use general security equipment 
when using the Internet. The most frequent used 
equipment is the antivirus software to prevent, detect and 
remove malware like computer viruses, malicious BHOs 
(Browser Helper Objects), hijackers, keyloggers, rootkits, 
trojan horses, worms, malicious LSPs (Layered Service 
Providers), adware and spyware. 
 The second used security equipment is the firewall, 
SW or HW based network security system that checks the 
incoming and outgoing network traffic by analyzing the 
data packets on a rule set and determining whether they 
should be allowed through or not. The firewall builds a 
bridge between the internal computer network it protects 
and the client after checking if the connected network is 
secure and trusted enough as shown in Figure 3 [14]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. SECURITY RISKS OF MEASURESERVER 
 The Measureserver module substantially contributes to 
the security risks. Since the module is the most important 
software component of REs, let us deal with these risks in 
more detail. Next, the analysis is performed about the 
likeliest attacks on that module by unauthorised clients or 
hackers in order to eliminate it or slow it down. 
A. Denial of service attack 
 This kind of attack has been shortly mentioned in the 
previous chapter. Since the attack significantly affects the 
!
!
Figure 3: The scheme of firewall functioning [16] 
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Measureserver and web server, it is indispensable to 
analyze this attack. Both components reside on the same 
computer (server) connected indirectly through LAN or 
directly to the Internet by means of the static IP address. 
As mentioned, Measureserver acts as the communication 
server between the ISES panel attached to an apparatus 
and the client. The web server provides client a web page 
of the RE. The denial of service attack (DoS attack) as 
illustrated on Figure 4 or the distributed denial of service 
attack (DDoS attack) may attempt to make the server 
computer (or network resource) unavailable to all the 
authorized clients using RE. Although the means to carry 
out, motives for, and targets of a DoS attack may vary.  It 
consists of the efforts to temporarily or indefinitely 
interrupt or suspend important services of a hosting 
server which is connected to the Internet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 One common method of the attack involves saturating 
server computer with external communications requests 
so much that it cannot respond to legitimate traffic or 
responds so slowly as to be rendered essentially 
unavailable. These attacks usually lead to a server 
overload. This attack is aimed at either forcing the 
targeted computer to reset or consuming its resources so 
that it can no longer provide its intended service or 
obstructing the communication between legal clients and 
the victim so that they can no longer appropriately 
communicate. Such kind of the attack negatively affects 
Measureserver with respect to the authorized clients. 
 Symptoms and manifestations have been defined for 
DoS attack as follows [15]: 
 - Inability to access any web site. 
 - Disconnecting from the Internet. 
 - Unavailability of a particular web site. 
 - Unusually slow network performance. 
 - Increase in the number of spam emails received. 
A denial of service attack may include execution of 
malware intended to: 
- Take the maximal processor's usage. 
- Trigger errors in the microcode of the machine. 
- Trigger errors in the sequencing of instructions in 
order to force the targeted computer into an unstable 
state or wholly lock-up for all authorized clients. 
- Exploit errors in the operating system, causing 
resource starvation and/or thrashing. 
- Crash the operating system itself. 
 In most cases, the denial of service attacks involve 
forging of IP sender addresses called IP address spoofing, 
so that the location of the attacking machines cannot be 
easily identified and to prevent filtering of the packets 
based on the source address [15]. 
B. Cross-site scripting attack 
 Cross-site scripting (XSS) is a type of the computer 
security vulnerability typically found in web applications. 
XSS allows attackers to inject client's side script into web 
pages browsed by other users. XSS vulnerability may be 
used by attackers to bypass access controls such as the 
same origin policy. An effect of the attack may range 
from a petty nuisance to a significant security risk 
depending on the sensitivity of the data handled by the 
vulnerable site and the nature of any security mitigation 
which is implemented by the site's owner. 
 The Measureserver module can be seriously affected 
through the web applications (browsers), which clients 
connected to the RE have to use. The web browsers 
intermediate the web page containing data outcomes and 
visualization. The client's web page is provided by the 
Nginx web server residing on the same computer as 
Measureserver. When a client completely loads a web 
page of the RE then the direct communication is 
established between that page and Measureserver. Since 
the web page contains many scripts written in JavaScript 
language and applets (small Java applications) so the risk 
of such attack is really high. Every implemented script or 
applet can be hit in order to modify them. After the 
malicious intervention, the modified script/applet can 
behave weirdly or uncontrollably with respect to the 
Measureserver, e.g. to send undefined values/events for 
processing or to perform cyclically some operations. 
Exploited operations can lead to overloading of the 
Measureserver or seriously damage the RE by the reason 
of short/long time cycling. 
 Let us now to analyze the cross-site scripting attack. 
Security on the web is based on a variety of mechanisms 
including underlying concept of trust known as the same 
origin policy. This states that if the content from one site 
is granted permission to access resources on the system, 
then any content from that site will share these 
permissions, while content from another site will have to 
be granted permissions separately. 
 Cross-site scripting uses known vulnerabilities in web 
based applications, their servers or plug-in systems they 
rely on. Exploiting one of these, they fold malicious 
content into the content being delivered from the 
compromised site. When the resulting combined content 
that arrives at the client's web browser, it has all been 
delivered from the trusted source and thus operates under 
the permissions granted to that system. By finding ways 
of injecting malicious scripts into web pages, an attacker 
can gain elevated access-privileges to sensitive page 
content, session cookies or a variety of other information 
maintained by the browser. Cross-site scripting attacks 
are therefore a special case of the code injection. 
 The cross-site scripting expression originally referred 
to the act of loading the attacked third-party web 
application from an unrelated attack site, in a manner that 
executes a fragment of JavaScript prepared by the 
attacker in the security context of the targeted domain 
The definition gradually expanded to encompass other 
  
Figure 4: The typical scheme of denial of service attack [17] 
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modes of code injection, including persistent and non-
JavaScript vectors (including Java, ActiveX, VBScript, 
Flash or HTML), causing some confusion to newcomers 
to the field of application security. 
 Most experts distinguish between at least two primary 
flavors of XSS: non-persistent and persistent shown in 
Figure 5. Some sources further divide these two groups 
into traditional (caused by server-side code flaws) and 
DOM-based (in client-side code) [18]. 
 Non-persistent - The non-persistent XSS vulnerability 
is by far the most common type. These holes show up 
when the data provided by a web client, most commonly 
in activating HTTP communication query parameters or 
in HTML form submissions, is used immediately by 
server-side scripts to parse and display a page of results 
to that user without sanitizing the request. 
 Persistent - The persistent XSS vulnerability is more 
devastating variant of a XSS flaw: it occurs when the data 
provided by the attacker is saved by the server and then 
permanently displayed on normal pages returned to other 
users in the course of regular browsing without proper 
HTML escaping. Persistent XSS can be more significant 
than other types because an attacker's malicious script is 
rendered automatically without the need to individually 
target victims or lure them to a third-party website. 
Particularly in the case of social networking sites, the 
code would be further designed to self-propagate across 
accounts, creating a type of a client's side worm. 
Traditional versus DOM-based vulnerabilities - The 
traditional vulnerabilities, XSS would occur in server's 
side code responsible for preparing the HTML response 
to be served to the client. DOM-based type occurs in the 
content processing stages performed by the client, 
typically in client's side JavaScript [18]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Brute force attack 
 The brute force attack is used by intruder who attempts 
to gain access to a server by guessing a user password, 
usually the root administrator, through the SSH server 
(based on the cryptographic network protocol for secure 
data communication), mail server or other service 
running on the server. The attacker will use software that 
will check every possible combination to find the one that 
works. Brute force detection software will alert client 
when multiple failed attempts to gain access are in 
progress and disable access from the obtrusive IP address. 
 It is worth mentioning the automated SSH brute force 
attack shown in Figure 6, which consists of the following 
phases in order to obtain valid information to log in the 
exposed system on a server [20]: 
- Attacker scans for present SSH daemons which are 
exposed to the Internet. 
- The scans can be done by bots (software applications 
that run automated tasks over the Internet). It usually 
scans target the regular SSH TCP 22 port. 
- Assuming the TCP 22 port is found open, service 
identification is attempted. 
- SSH banners can expose info about the SSH service 
and the underlying operating system. 
- Based on the gathered information, attacker tries to 
discover valid username and password combinations 
through SSH brute force attacks. These are not quite 
brute force attacks but an attacker rather uses weak 
passwords dictionaries for this purpose. 
- A prime target will be the root account in principle to 
enter the attacked system. 
- If root login over SSH is allowed with a weak 
password, so the attacker may end up in complete 
control of the exposed system to make any illegal 
intervention [20]. 
 The brute force attack could be eventually applied on a 
central computer where the Measureserver resides and 
provides services between the authorized clients and 
ISES RE. This attack is probable because the hosting 
computer is connected through the static IP address to the 
Internet. An administrator of the REs has always an 
option to enter the computer by username and belonging 
password via the Remote Desktop application which is an 
integral part of the Window operating system. Such a 
way of the administrating is important in order to 
maintain the REs by responsible person. If any hacker 
succeeds in his malicious intervention to break through 
the authentication, then all the installed applications 
reveal him on the computer including the operating 
system. It means the potential intruder would affect 
Measureserver, e.g. to shut it down or re-configure it to 
exploit the equipment of the REs. This inexperienced 
encroachment would have an unexpected impact on the 
reliability and performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. SUGGESTION OF SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
 Every realized RE consists of many various SW and 
HW components communicating with each other by 
packets, protocols and signals. These components are 
controlled by the central computer that is exposed to 
clients on the Internet. Hence, it is important to deal with 
the security policy and countermeasures to prevent 
malicious attacks leading to the damage of the REs. 
A. SW countermeasures 
 The countermeasures should include several security 
mechanisms for an efficient defense of the exposed 
computer covering the Measureserver and other related 
 
!!!
Figure 5: The typical scheme of persistent cross-site scripting [19] 
  
Figure 6: The example of automated SSH brute force attack [20] 
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applications. The following recommendations should be 
realized to avoid the mentioned attacks. 
1) Authenticating and account management before 
connection to the network. 
- All accounts should have strong passwords. 
- Administrative or root accounts should have even 
stronger passwords or pass phrases. 
- Administrator or root account should be used only 
when absolutely necessary. 
- Adding service accounts should be avoided to the 
default administrators group. 
- Assignment of a unique administrative account 
and password should be done for each individual 
to distinguish activities among administrators. 
- Regular review of the access list or log for users 
should be done in order to look for unexpected 
rights or changes. 
2) Installing and patching the operating system before 
connection to the network. 
- Installed software should be current on the 
computer. The operating system and applications 
should be vendor supported for security patches. 
- When installing applications, it is important to 
make sure to install applications that are needed 
only and to install the latest versions of all 
applications including available security patches. 
3) Using necessary operating system and services. 
- Configuration of installed applications should be 
done, to disable all unused features and to limit 
the availability of any enabled features. 
- Computer should only provide services needed for 
its role in an organization. 
- Elimination of Telnet and FTP should be done, to 
use SSH instead. 
4) Installing adequate filters or firewall. 
- Installation and configuration of a packet filtering 
utility should be done like the TCP wrappers or 
SW firewall to protect individual services. 
- The rules should reflect the acceptable usage and 
security policies which have been defined for the 
target computer. 
- Operating system filters that deny or permit 
certain traffic should be used if available. 
- Periodical review of the filters should be done for 
inappropriate or unneeded access. 
5) Setting up and reviewing intended logs. 
- Configuration of all used services should be done 
so that they log all connections and authentication 
information. Therewithal, forwarding all logs is 
recommended to a highly secure computer. 
- Someone should be assigned the responsibility to 
review possible security violations identified in 
the system logs. 
6) Installing security related software. 
- Installation of anti-virus or other virus filtering 
applications should be done including daily 
updating process for the latest virus definitions. 
- SSH or other encrypted and secure methods of 
access should be installed if remote access or 
remote administration services are needed for a 
maintenance. SSH improves the security of user 
accounts by efficient encrypting login sessions. 
B. HWcountermeasures 
 The countermeasures provide administrator of ISES 
RE the following mechanisms for the defense of the 
exposed computer residing in a laboratory. 
 Locking up the room - Even before the administrator 
locks down the computer, in fact, before he even turns it 
on for the first time, he should ensure that good locks are 
used on room doors. Of course, the best lock in the world 
does no good if it is not used, so the administrator also 
needs policies requiring those doors to be locked any time 
the room is unoccupied and the policies should set out 
who has the key or key code. 
 Setting up surveillance - Locking the door to the 
computer room is a good first step but someone could 
break in or someone who has the authorized access could 
misuse that authority. An administrator needs a way to 
know who goes in, out and when. A log book for signing 
in and out is the most elemental way to accomplish this 
but it has a lot of drawbacks. Persons with malicious 
intent are likely to bypass it. A better solution than the 
log book is the authentication system incorporated into 
the locking devices like the smart card, token, or 
biometric scan to unlock the doors and the record is 
required to identify persons who enter the laboratory. 
 Backing up data - Backing up important data is an 
essential element in a disaster recovery but the 
administrator must not forget that the information on 
those backup tapes or disks can be stolen and used by 
someone outside the building. Many administrators keep 
the backups next to the computer in the room. They 
should be locked in a drawer or at the similar place. 
Ideally, a set of backups should be kept off site and the 
administrator must take care to ensure that they are 
secured in that offsite location. 
 Disabling unnecessary drives - If the administrator 
does not want on-site persons copying information from 
the computer to removable media, he can disable or 
remove floppy drives, USB ports and other means of 
connecting external drives on the computer. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 The remote experiments provide students and teachers 
with a new way of absorbing information in the field of 
natural sciences and technological sciences. This modern 
approach of education allows all interested people to 
clearly understand particular phenomena by the real 
experimenting. These REs enable remote touching of 
specific equipment in the e-laboratory. Students are 
allowed to monitor only or to monitor and control 
together the RE according to the type of chosen 
sophistication and complexity. This way gives a chance 
for students of a distant study or to those who cannot, for 
different reasons, participate on regular laboratory classes 
to understand the taught subject matter. 
 The REs are perceived as the user friendly tool for easy 
entering the e-laboratory via the Internet by web browsers 
anywhere. This advantage unfortunately brings security 
risks for involved SW and HW modules. Some of the 
modules are more resistant against malicious attacks but 
some of them are more or less vulnerable. Attackers 
generally exploit weak points and flaws in particular SW 
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components to control them partially or wholly in order 
to damage RE, decelerate it or cause shutdown. Hence, 
the security aspect becomes more important nowadays to 
ensure the proper operation for authorized students and 
teachers. Unstable or malfunction REs exert a bad effect 
in the eyes of prospective and existing users. 
 Attackers have to often struggle with various SW and 
HW countermeasures, which are breached sometimes. 
Fortunately enough, these attacks are occasionally 
reduced or fenced off. That is why this issue is analyzed 
in detail for the purpose of finding adequate measures to 
minimize or prevent such malicious attacks. This analysis 
uncovers common and specific security risks, which 
would seriously affect the most important components of 
the REs. The paper especially deals with the core 
component called Measureserver intended for a direct 
communication among the clients and the RE apparatus. 
All the possible security aspects are described in detail 
for the physical & informatics HW and informatics SW. 
 Another serious danger constitutes the security risks of 
web applications due to the remote connecting of the 
interested clients via web browsers. The client's interface 
allows potential attackers to apply various intrusion 
methods to exploit possible flaws on the hosting 
computer where all the important SW components reside. 
The description is not so deep, it just concerns of threats 
like the spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information 
disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege. 
 The major topic of the paper is focused on the security 
risks of the Measureserver which can be damaged or even 
crashed by malicious attackers. The most probable threat 
is the denial of service attack that can significantly 
decelerate or put aside the hosting computer controlling 
the RE. The next threat is the cross-site scripting used up 
for injecting client's side script into web pages browsed 
by other users who wish for experimenting. The last 
threat is the brute force attack performed by intruders 
who attempt to gain access to the hosting computer by 
guessing a password, usually the root administrator. 
 Finally, we provide the efficient security solutions. At 
first, the SW countermeasures are proposed including 
several common and specific security mechanisms for the 
practical defense. The description comprises the client’s 
authentication, patching the operating system, review 
logs usage, security-related applications and others. 
Furthermore, the HW countermeasures are provided. 
They consist of the locking up the computer room, setting 
up surveillance and backing up important data to prevent 
or mitigate physical attacks. 
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